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This report examines the opportunIties offered through in-
creased use of economic and fiscal instruments in environmental 
policy. It has been compiled by a group of national experts at the 
request of the Environment Council of 28 November 1989. The 
presidency and the group's secretariat were provided through 
the Commission's services. The group also made use of work 
previously carried out by the OECD in this area. 
Since the group members participated in the work on an in-
dividual bases, this report is neither the responsibility of the 
Commission nor of the Member States. It aims to provide a report 
on the actual state of use of these types of instruments in the 
Community, to stimulate discussion and to provide a basis for 
reflection which may prove useful in order to direct future proj-
ects in this area. 
This report represents a fairly general consensus between the 
participants of the experts' group. Nevertheless, the text does not 
necessarily reflect all the opinions of each individual expert on 
all the issues discussed. 
1.2 A New Impetus for Economic Instruments 
The use of environmental policy instruments which incorpo-
rate market mechanisms has been under discussion for many 
years. On the other hand, the extent of specific action at Com-
munity level has been very limited. Although there are many 
situations in which market-based instruments offer potential ad-
t The editors are grateful to Francesco Saverio Solari, Member of the Cabinet of 
Commissioner Ripa di Meana, for permission to publish this Report. 
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vantages in terms of economic efficiency, effectiveness and flexi-
bility, there has in the past been a preference for a regulatory 
approach, which was perceived as offering a greater assurance 
that environmental quality standards would be achieved and 
maintained. In addition industry was unenthusiastic for economic 
instruments, which were regarded as imposing additional cost 
burdens. 
In recent years, in a climate of increasing environmental prob-
lems and a growing perception of their seriousness, a new per-
spective has developed. There is also a better understanding of 
the contribution which economic instruments can make in cre-
ating incentives for the progressive improvement of environmen-
tal quality. Such improvement is indispensable for the long-term 
sustainability of economic development, both for the Community 
and on a global scale. 
This new perspective was recognized by Community environ-
ment ministers at their informal meeting of 21 April 1990: the 
presidency conclusions to this meeting state that "Ministers ac-
knowledged the value of supplementing existing regulatory in-
struments .... by the use of economic and fiscal instruments." 
On this occasion the need was underlined that while the Internal 
Market gives a welcome boost to economic growth in the Com-
munity, environmental policies need to ensure that this growth 
is environmentally sustainable. A similar line was taken by the 
Ministerial Declaration of the Bergen Conference on sustainable 
development (May 1990) which agreed, "in support of sustainable 
development ... to make more extensive use of economic instru-
ments in conjunction with ... regulatory approaches". 
Other recent developments affecting the Community require 
a Community position on the use of economic instruments. The 
prospective removal of fiscal barriers in the Internal Market ren-
ders differences in national product taxes, including those insti-
tuted for environmental purposes, difficult to sustain and so cre-
ates an impetus for harmonization at Community level. 
A recent report prepared, at the request of the Commission, 
by an independent Task Force, suggests that with completion of 
the Internal Market the Community will undergo a far-reaching 
process of structural change, which will in turn strengthen the 
need for integration of the environmental dimension in Com-
munity policies. As a policy response, the Task Force recom-
mended that greater use be made of economic and fiscal instru-
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ments, and that the harmonization of taxes in the Internal Market 
should incorporate an environmental dimension. 
Lastly, the European Council of 26 June 1990 in Dublin 
adopted in its Declaration a chapter on environmental issues, 
containing the following statement: "Standards designed to en-
sure a high level of environmental protection will remain the 
cornerstone of Community environment policy. But the tradi-
tional "command and control" approach should now be supple-
mented, where appropriate, by economic and fiscal measures if 
environmental considerations are to be fully integrated into other 
policy areas, if pollution is to be prevented at source, and if the 
polluter is to pay. We therefore call on the Commission to accel-
erate its work in this field and to present, before the end of 1990, 
proposals for a framework or guidelines within which such mea-
sures could be put into effect by the Member States in a manner 
consistent with the Treaties". 
1.3 The Need for Community Action 
Economic and fiscal instruments are more and more in use and 
under study in environmental policy of the Member States. For 
several reasons which partly stem from the Treaty, as well as 
from the requirement of a more efficient and effective environ-
mental Community policy, this tendency should be recognized, 
while the consequences and potential at EC level should be ex-
amined. 
a) Article 130r of the Treaty, as amended by the Single Eu-
ropean Act, has clearly given the Community a mandate to 
preserve, to protect and to improve the environmental quality of the 
Community, and to take care for a prudent and rational utilization 
of natural resources. Until now this goal has not been attained 
to a sufficient extent, as the tremendous scale of total pol-
lution continues to grow in the Community, as well as on a 
global level. 
Even though in certain Member States and sectors, there 
has been a decoupling between economic growth and en-
ergy use, present regulations and incentives are evaluated 
to be insufficient to compensate environmental impact of 
this growth in the medium and long term. A substantial 
reinforcement of environmental policy in the Member 
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States, as well as at Community level, has therefore become 
unavoidable. In addition, for certain problems, the objective 
of a high environmental quality has been translated into 
international agreements of which the Community is a sig-
natory and which require stronger environmental policy 
instruments. 
Analyses, both in the Member States and on Community 
level, have shown that there is a strong need to reinforce 
the implementation of existing directives and other legal 
measures. The use of economic and fiscal instruments can 
become one important way of doing so, and the Community 
will be forced to take this step in order to reach the goal of 
improving the quality of its environment. 
Lastly, several Member States have already developed the 
undervalued potential of economic and fiscal instruments 
as a strong addition to direct regulation. If it is to be guar-
anteed that the protection of the environment goes together 
with and mutually reinforces the completion of the Internal 
Market, and if initiatives by Member States are not to be 
blocked, for instance, for reasons of competition, a response 
to this evolution at EC level is required. 
b) The need for a common approach in the use of economic 
and fiscal instruments in the EC is essentially based on two 
pillars: 
1) To fulfill the objectives, Community environmental pol-
ity needs to be strengthened and a more forceful set of 
instruments must be used than has been available in the 
past. Therefore economic instruments have to be consid-
ered. They respect very well the principles for Com-
munity environmental policies, as set out in Article 
130r(2): 
- the need for preventive action; 
- the need for rectifying environmental pollution at 
source; 
- that the polluter should pay; 
- that environmental protection requirements shall be a 
component of the Community'S other policies. 
A striking example of the need for adequate economic 
instruments has been the creation of an EC-wide network 
for unleaded petrol, being the precondition for the wide-
spread introduction of the catalyst converter. Only a sub-
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stantial price differential between leaded and unleaded pe-
trol was able to generate a massive switch in consumer 
behaviour. However, a lack of coordinated action at Com-
munity level caused legal difficulties and uncertainties, and 
created a loss of efficiency which could easily have been 
avoided. 
In evaluation of a further use of economic instruments, 
account has to be taken of the elements mentioned in Article 
130r(3), especially regional development and the costs and 
benefits of action and non-action. 
2) Article 100e specifies that the measures designed to 
achieve the Internal Market must incorporate the envi-
ronmental dimension. Establishing the Internal Market 
will lead to integration of economic activities. Since eco-
nomic instruments of environmental protection, as ap-
plied in Member States, are designed to adjust economic 
activities in an environmentally-friendly direction, the 
introduction of such instruments must be coordinated, 
if these economic activities or their environmental im-
pacts have a strong international dimension. In these 
cases economic instruments can affect price mechanisms 
in sectors that are already to a small or large extent 
subject to Community policies (e.g., transport, agricul-
ture, energy generation, parts of industry). 
c) Article 130r(4) sets the scope of Community action in ac-
cordance with a subsidiarity approach. There are a number of 
reasons why Community measures may be necessary for the 
achievement of the objectives set out in Article 130r(1). As 
an example, this is the case when Community measures are 
more effective than a series of national measures in achiev-
ing environmental objectives at lower cost and with a mini-
mum of economic disruption. 
Firstly, this is particularly true for transboundary (pollution 
of rivers and seas, air pollution, waste disposal) or global 
pollution problems (greenhouse effect, depletion of the ozone 
layer). Transboundary problems are solved most efficiently 
when common instruments are applied, taking into account 
differences in regional natural endowments. For global 
problems a concerted action is most effective and efficient. 
Secondly, in the context of progress towards completion 
of the Internal Market, an uneven use of economic instru-
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ments may cause distortion of trade and competition. A 
distinction needs to be made between measures related to 
products and emissions. 
Regarding products, an uneven use of charges is more 
likely to affect competition, when products are easily trade-
able. Then, producers or consumers are inclined to "shop" 
abroad and avoid the charge, diminishing the effectiveness 
of the charge. Generally, raw materials and intermediary 
goods (including car fuels) are more tradeable than con-
sumer goods. As a result, it is necessary to harmonize the 
product chargesltaxes/deposits or to develop a framework 
indicating how Member States can apply these instruments 
without infraction of the Community law. Otherwise, they 
will be forced to rely on Article 36 of the Treaty to create 
an obstacle to trade justified by environmental purposes. 
Regarding emissions, uneven application of measures 
(charge rates, pollution allowed for by tradeable permits) 
may give rise to changes in competition patterns, even when 
commonly applied. Such changes merely reflect differences 
in national environmental conditions and should not be 
considered as distortions. 
A harmonized application of economic instruments to 
both categories is needed to avoid barriers to trade within 
the Internal Market resulting from artificial differences in 
cost structures. Moreover, in the absence of a common ap-
proach each Member State may wait for others to act, in 
order to avoid a competitive disadvantage, even when this 
is a small one, limited to the short term. Thus the introduc-
tion of further development of economic instruments at 
national level may be constrained by the lack of EC initia-
tives in this field. 
Thirdly, introduction of economic instruments in the EC 
provides a continuous incentive for research and development of 
clean technology. A growing domestic demand will give the 
EC's eco-business and clean technology an advanced posi-
tion in a rapidly expanding world market. 
Experience from the past indicates the importance to dis-
tinguish between the incentive impact of economic instru-
ments and raising revenues. Once the incentive impact is 
guaranteed, there is no need for the destination of the 
revenues to be "harmonized". In principle, incentive taxes 
should not increase the tax burden and should be "budget-
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neutral". However, the acceptance of environmental taxes 
is likely to increase when the raised revenues are used for 
environmental purposes. Furthermore, when revenues are 
used to increase the incentive impact by means of subsidies, 
they have to be prevented from running against EC rules 
concerning State Aids. The ongoing revision of the Com-
munity framework on State Aids in environmental matters 
should therefore provide adequate criteria to guide Member 
States in this field. 
As a conclusion, there are important arguments for EC 
initiatives in the field of economic instruments. However, it 
will have to be examined case by case to which extent the 
development of these economic and fiscal instruments needs 
to be fully harmonized (guidelines, specific proposals, level 
of charges/taxes). 
2. ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: SOME 
BASIC ELEMENTS 
A precondition for a more extensive application of economic 
instruments is a good understanding of their operation and of 
their performance, as assessed against appropriate evaluation cri-
teria. Some theoretical points are outlined in annex 1, while some 
important examples are developed in annex 2. Only a brief sum-
mary of the theoretical and factual analysis is developed in this 
chapter. 
2.1 The Market Mechanism 
The environmental problems related to the growing demand 
for energy and transport, the over-use of fertilizer or the growing 
production of waste, are striking examples of the fact that at 
present market mechanisms provide, from an environmental 
point of view, wrong incentives, while many regulations appar-
ently are not sufficient to generate cleaner behaviour, technolo-
gies or products. 
The market mechanism is basic to the functioning of economic 
instruments of environmental policy. If environmental resources 
are properly valued, the costs of using the environment will be 
taken fully into account in private economic decision-making. 
This implies that environmental resources are used in "sustaina-
ble" quantities, provided that their prices are based on their 
scarcity and place an appropriate value on non-renewable re-
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sources. Economic and fiscal instruments are meant to correct 
current market prices by internalizing environmental costs which 
are treated by the market mechanisms as external. Due to nu-
merical valuation problems, the price corrected for environmen-
tal scarcity cannot be defined. Consequently, economic and fiscal 
instruments need to apply a pragmatic approach affecting prices 
in such a way that changes in behaviour and technology, especially 
in the longer term, are brought about. 
The incentive effect of economic instruments through a proper 
pricing is essential and enables a complementary approach with 
regulatory instruments. Indeed, economic instruments create a 
continuous stimulus to reduce pollution more than required by 
regulatory standards, and a continuous pressure on the polluter's 
budget to reconsider his possibilities for a more environmentally-
friendly behaviour. 
In principle, this creates both static and dynamic efficiency, 
implying that polluters behave in an optimal way under constant 
as well as changing technological conditions. 
2.2 Evaluation Criteria 
In assessing policy instruments the following criteria are cen-
tral: 
Environmental effectiveness 
Effectiveness relates to the degree to which environmental pol-
icy objectives are achieved, whether defined in terms of effluent 
standards, ambient concentrations, the consumption of polluting 
products, etc. 
Efficiency 
Dynamic efficiency relates to adjustments to the new price 
structure over time - for example, as a result of technological 
innovation or changing conditions of environmental systems. One 
can also distinguish static efficiency which is when a given envi-
ronmental objective is achieved at minimum cost in the short 
term. 
Practicability and administration costs 
The agreement with the institutional framework is an impor-
tant element, such as the compatibility with the Treaty and EC 
regulations, and with international agreements such as the 
GATT. The implementation of environmental policy measures 
implies costs of information and costs of administration, moni-
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toring and enforcement. These costs can influence to a large 
extent the "overall" efficiency of instruments. 
Fairness and acceptability 
Criteria of fairness and acceptability relate to distributional 
effects, and to an equitable treatment of parties involved. 
Economic impact 
Application of economic instruments has an impact on the 
competitive structure. Some industries may lose, but others will 
win. Such structural changes may create adjustment costs during 
the transition period. The potential impact on macro-economic 
indicators, in particular those of inflation, economic growth and 
international competitiveness, has therefore to be considered. 
2.3 Economic Instruments 
Instruments could be categorized as "economic" in so far as 
they affect through the market mechanism costs and benefits of 
alternative actions open to economic agents, with the effect of 
influencing behaviour in a way that is favourable for the environ-
ment. These are inter alia: 
- Environmental charges and taxes; 
- Tradeable emission permits; 
- Deposit-refund systems; 
- Enforcement incentives; 
- Financial aid; 
- Industry agreements; 
- Environmental liability. 
The difference between charges and taxes is determined by 
the way in which the revenues are allocated: tax revenues are 
added to the public budget, while charge revenues are used for 
financing environmental measures. As this report does not deal 
with the destination of the revenues, taxes and charges will be 
used as substitutes. 
Theoretical analyses have pointed out that no general prefer-
ence can be expressed in favour of a particular instrument in 
environmental policy. The choice of an instrument will depend 
very much on the nature of the environmental problem and the 
sources of it, on administrative considerations and on the socio-
economic context. 
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2.4 An Overview of Current Practice 
Although economic instruments are not new in the field of 
environmental policy, their potential impact is at present far from 
being exploited. Evidence from various studies suggests the fol-
lowing general observations: 
- Economic instruments mainly act as adjunct to direct regu-
lation. Authorities generally are reluctant to apply economic 
instruments to major environmental problems without the 
support of regulatory measures. This is due to the voluntary 
character of economic instruments which are not seen to 
provide sufficiently strong assurance of environmental qual-
ity, and to an inability or unwillingness to create really force-
ful economic instruments. 
- As to the type of economic instruments applied, charges pre-
dominate. A major application of emissions trading occurs in 
the context of the USA air quality policy, and to a certain 
extent in the Federal Republic of Germany. Deposit-refund 
systems are traditionally applied to drink containers, but are 
also recently considered as a device for preventing pollution 
with harmful substances. Although subsidies are applied, 
there is a general conviction that they should be restricted to 
specific cases only, such as the promotion and diffusion of 
clean technology and compensation for economic hardship. 
- A distinction must be made in practice between the incentive 
(economic efficiency) function of charges and their role in 
raising revenue. The latter predominates in existing charging 
systems and is likely to remain important in the future. 
- Emission charges have been more successful in water quality 
policy than in other environmental areas. Several countries 
have established water effluent charges, whereby the reve-
nues are used for financing collective water treatment instal-
lations. 
- Examples of product charges now in operation in various 
countries include charges on packaging, batteries, fertilizers 
and pesticides, amongst others. Their main purpose is raising 
revenues which are earmarked for specific environmental 
measures. 
- Tax differentiation seems to be a promising instrument. Tax 
differentiation has been effective with respect to leaded gas-
oline and clean cars. This type of economic instrument may 
be more acceptable in view of its budgetary-neutral character, 
since it does not lead to a net increase in government reve-
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nues. Tax differentiation requires a relatively simple admin-
istration, when the invoicing takes place along existing tax 
channels. 
These observations point to certain conclusions which are to 
be taken into account when defining new instruments. These 
include: 
- In defining the purpose of charges a clear distinction must 
be made between incentive impact and raising revenues. 
- Incentive charges/taxes must have rates which are high 
enough to produce the desired change in behaviour. This 
implies that in general charge rates on products must be 
higher than they currently are. 
- In ex ante assessment of the results of new instruments prac-
tical matters, such as administrative costs, must explicitly be 
taken into account, because they are of paramount impor-
tance for the effectiveness and efficiency of the instrument 
considered. 
- Emissions trading is embedded in the regulatory structure. 
In the short run, its possibilities and results will depend on 
the way direct regulation has been formulated i.e. the less 
efficient the initial allocation, the greater the scope for im-
provement through trading. In the long run, trading will be 
related to the extent of diverging costs of pollution abatement 
techniques and/or clean technologies. 
Current experiences show that, if well conceived, economic 
instruments are effective in changing behaviour. This is illus-
trated by a number of examples which are described III more 
detail in annex 2. These concern: 
- tax differentiation for cleaner cars; 
- water effluent charge; 
- deposit-refund system for beverage containers; 
- charge for non-biodegradable plastic bags; 
- differentiation of excise duties on leaded and unleaded gas-
oline. 
3. ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS IN WHICH ECONOMIC 
INSTRUMENTS CAN PLAY A MAJOR ROLE 
3.1 General 
Different approaches are possible for application of economic 
instruments to environmental problems. One may choose to start 
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from the environmental media approach and select water, waste, 
air (including chemical pollution and noise) as separate issues. 
Or, one may choose to subsequently deal with important eco-
nomic sectors such as energy, transport, agriculture and industry. 
The OECD, in developing guidelines for the application of eco-
nomic instruments, combines both approaches, although the em-
phasis is on environmental media. 
The concern of the Community with the application of eco-
nomic instruments has much to do with the environmental prob-
lems its Member States have to face and the scale on which these 
problems occur, be it domestic, transboundary or global. Fur-
thermore, the point of impact of instruments is related to emis-
sions, processes or products of specific sectors. Thus, in dealing 
with environmental problems in which economic instruments can 
play a major role, a distinction may be made according to the 
scale of the problem and to the economic sectors concerned. It 
must further be recognized that there are some global environ-
mental problems which require multinational responses at the 
broadest possible level, and that in such cases the multilateral use 
of economic and fiscal instruments needs to be analyzed carefully 
with a view to effectiveness and distortions of competition. 
The purpose of this section is therefore to evaluate the scope 
for Community involvement in the development of economic and 
fiscal instruments in environmental policy. An exhaustive treat-
ment of all possible policy measures for specific environmental 
problems will not be given, nor an overview of existing EC reg-
ulations in the related field. The scope is limited to indicate how 
economic and fiscal instruments can contribute to an adequate 
solution for environmental problems of a global and transboun-
dary nature. 
3.2 Environmental Problems on the Global Scale 
3.2.1 Greenhouse Effect and Energy Consumption 
The Communication on "Energy and the Environment" 
[COM(89) 369] points out that the emission of greenhouse gases, 
especially CO2, is now one of the most pressing environmental 
problems of the energy sector. The further improvement of en-
ergy efficiency and the increase of energy conservation should 
be the cornerstone of any energy policy to tackle the greenhouse 
problem. Therefore, new taxation regimes for energy products 
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or the introduction of a specific C02 tax have to be developed 
which can, together with other policy measures, guarantee a suf-
ficient slow-down of future energy demand. Furthermore, these 
may be tools to ensure that energy costs reflect the full environ-
mental cost. New taxation or emissions trading proposals will have 
to satisfy at the same time energy, environmental and macro-
economic requirements and will also have to take account of the 
fact that fully effective solutions call for actions at a global scale. 
To complement new energy efficiency activities, like the already 
announced SAVE programme, energy policies should aim at the 
promotion of low or zero greenhouse gas-emitting energy 
sources. The latter implies the potential of substantial switches to 
natural gas, although the consequences of such changes on a 
global scale need to be analyzed carefully. 
In dealing with the energy sector several reasons support a 
more important role for economic instruments: 
1) The broad variety of economic activities, fuels and consum-
ers render regulatory and control approaches difficult; 
2) Only energy prices give in a market economy permanent 
incentives for the rational use of energy; 
3) The "polluter pays principle" is a basic criterion for allocat-
ing the economic and social costs of pollution; 
4) Pricing systems for pollution save in terms of information 
requirements for government agencies as far as they operate 
in favour of improved technology. 
As a general rule, direct charging of emissions is most desirable 
for reasons of effectiveness and efficiency. However, although 
this can be envisaged for large industrial plants (e.g. power 
plants), this is not manageable for the case of traffic, central 
heating systems and small combustion units. In this case, a more 
workable solution is that of imposing a charge on fossil fuels, 
according to the contribution of the fuel to the greenhouse prob-
lem. In the light of these sectoral difficulties, the most adequate 
overall approach needs to be identified. It will also be important 
to identify the appropriate level of action. To avoid economic dis-
tortions between Member States and to achieve maximum environmental 
effectiveness, a common framework for the charging/taxing of greenhouse 
gas emissions from fossil fuels should be elaborated and agreed at Com-
munity level, taking into account Global Warming Potential (GWP) of 
different fuels and other relevant factors. It must be recognized, how-
ever, that there are some greenhouse gases, such as methane, 
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where there may be practical difficulties in applying fiscal instru-
ments. 
Although such a charging system should aim at a relatively 
larger market share of environmentally-sound energy sources, 
aspects of interfuel competition need to be taken into account. 
In this context it should be remembered that nuclear energy does 
not generate any greenhouse gas emissions but faces its own 
specific environmental problems like safety, management and 
disposal of wastes. 
Given the price elasticities for energy demand, a clear and well 
defined programme for a substantial but phased increase of en-
ergy prices over time will be necessary to reach the objectives as 
put forward in the Commission's communication on the Com-
munity targets for the greenhouse problem [COM(90) 469]. Such 
a long-term programme could ensure an incentive to environ-
mentally-friendly behaviour, while leaving time to consumers and 
producers to adapt their strategies and technologies. Moreover, 
stabilizing price expectations will significantly reduce potential 
adjustment costs for the Community, while at the same time 
contribute to the creation of a competitive advantage in energy-
efficient technologies. 
Possible unwanted side-effects (such as social impact) can be 
avoided by adequate accompanying measures, by Member States, 
which may be financed by the revenues raised by the envisaged 
taxes. There is, however, from an environmental point of view, 
no need to harmonize these measures or the way in which they 
are financed. 
As a global reduction of greenhouse gases is required, in line 
with the conclusions of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC), action on a global scale should be the ultimate 
goal. However, at present it is likely that full international agree-
ment on reducing energy-related emissions of greenhouse gases 
may not be achieved in the near future (particularly if the par-
ticipation of the developing countries is to be assured). Further-
more, there are substantial penalties in delaying effective action 
on emissions as far as the build-up of atmospheric concentrations 
of greenhouse gases are concerned; and finally, the industrialized 
countries are responsible for the major part of past and present 
greenhouse gas emissions. 
For these reasons, concerted action should be taken now by 
those industrialized countries, including the EC, who are ready 
to agree among themselves on measures for the reduction of 
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energy-related emissions of greenhouse gases. Such an agreement 
among like-minded countries and the Community could enter 
into force well in advance of the Global Climate Convention, 
which is expected'to be initiated at the second World Climate 
Conference in October/November 1990. It could further serve as 
a model for a relevant protocol to that Convention. As called for 
in the Bergen Declaration, an agreed approach to the use of economic 
instruments as a means of reducing energy-related greenhouse gas-emis-
sions should be an essential feature of coordinated action in this context 
and, ideally, of any wider binding international legal instrument. 
3.2.2 Damage to the Ozone Layer and the Use of CFCs 
A product charge or tax can be envisaged on CFCs produced or 
imported into the Community. This would follow the experience in 
Denmark that imposed a 200% charge on CFCs used in its ter-
ritory, and that of the USA that imposed a graduated charge on 
CFCs that ranges from 100% in 1990 to 400% by the end of the 
century. 
The charge/tax will result in making CFCs more expensive, so 
that they could be replaced faster by the substitute chemicals 
currently under development; these chemicals are expected to 
cost about 3 to 5 times the current CFC prices. A substantial 
chargeltax on CFCs will therefore help to achieve the targets for 
the coming decade which are set by the Montreal Protocol on 
substances that deplete ozone and of which the Community is 
one of the signatories 
The charge/tax can be collected efficiently since there is only a 
small number of producers within the Community. An analogous 
measure needs to be developed for other ozone-depleting sub-
stances that are also to be covered by the Montreal Protocol i.e. 
halons, methyl chloroform and carbon tetrachloride. In that case 
the charge/tax rate should be proportional to the 'ozone depleting 
potential' (ODP). 
3.3 Environmental Problems on the Regional Scale 
3.3.1 Water Pollution with Oxygen-Demanding and other Substances 
A number of countries operate water pollution charges, and in 
some cases the charge has an explicit incentive purpose. Water 
pollution charges have had a varying success in abating water 
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pollution, in particular with respect to oxygen demand. In the 
mid-1970s the Commission sought to develop proposals for a 
Community directive on water pollution charges. This reflected 
interest both in the use of economic instruments and in the 
harmonization of cost allocation procedures. The framework for 
such a proposal was already established in the 1975 Council Rec-
ommendation on Cost Allocation which recalls the adoption of 
the "polluter pays" principle in 1973. 
Thus there is a good case for a common approach to water 
pollution charges in the Community, regarding different issues. 
Firstly, in the framework of a strict application of the polluter 
pays principle as currently defined, user charges could be more 
effective and efficient when they cover all the costs of water 
purification and treatment. Second, emission charges can provide 
an adequate incentive for all discharges to prevent or reduce 
their effluents. A common approach might include agreements 
with respect to the circumstances in which specified substances 
should be covered by the charge base. A sufficient time of antic-
ipation and increasing charge rates should promote the accep-
tance and impact of such a system. The exact charge rates have 
to depend on national conditions and should be established na-
tion-by-nation. 
The Community should promote the use of incentive charge/ 
tax rates. Although all revenues generated by such measures are 
national, an EC framework could specify how to use them to 
increase the incentive effect of the charges/taxes, without affect-
ing the polluter pays principle. A Community framework for water 
management taxes and charges has to be developed to offer guidance to 
the Member States reviewing or constructing their national schemes. 
3.3.2 The Discharges of Nutrients by Agriculture 
The agricultural sector causes a variety of environmental prob-
lems, including contamination of soil and groundwater with pes-
ticides and eutrophicating substances such as nitrates and phos-
phates, as well as the impoverishment of the countryside. 
Financial instruments, in the form of price support, have 
played an important role in the Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP). This price support, in accordance with the original objec-
tives of the CAP, has secured high and stable prices, which in 
turn has encouraged intensive farming practices, often to the 
detriment of the environment. 
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A number of factors has led to a process whereby price support 
is being reduced and where financial incentives are now emerging 
for farmers who adopt methods compatible with the environment 
(extensification, environmentally-friendly farming, etc.). 
Since there is a large diversity within the Community in the 
nature and intensity of agriculture and in the form and severity 
of environmental impacts, a diversified policy is required. In 
general, pollution control in agriculture is more difficult due to 
the diffuse character of pesticide and fertilizer application. How-
ever, direct regulation does exist in some Member States and at 
Community level, and new legislation to control nitrate pollution 
from chemical fertilizers and manure is under discussion in the 
Council. 
A more intensive use of economic instruments, comprising incentives 
as referred to above, has to be developed in the broader context of the 
Common Agricultural Policy. Important issues to consider in this 
respect are the abolition of certain national aids and the possible 
taxation of inputs such as fertilizers and pesticides. 
A charge on fertilizer would have to be set at a relatively high 
rate to have any effect in the short term, due to the economics 
of fertilizer application. The use of fertilizers offers a high return 
in the form of additional revenues at modest costs. These returns 
are heavily influenced by the level of agricultural prices, including 
those set within the Common Agricultural Policy. An incentive 
tax could be channelled back to the farming community to com-
pensate for losses in farmers' income e.g. on the basis of the 
cultivated area. In the case of moderate fertilizer charges, how-
ever, the revenue could be reserved for financing actions bene-
ficial to the environment within the framework of the CAP. 
3.3.3 Air Pollution by Emission of S02, NOx, Particulates, VOC 
Some "regional" problems of air pollution, such as acidification 
and concentration of ozone, are also caused by energy use. There-
fore, energy saving as elaborated under 3.1.1 is also a priority 
for the prevention of air-polluting emissions of S02, NOx , VOC 
and particulates. However, these emissions have to be reduced 
further and faster than CO2 emissions. Contrary to CO2 emis-
sions, which are directly related to fuel consumption, emissions 
of S02, NOx , VOC and particulates can also be reduced or pre-
vented by the introduction of appropriate equipment or cleaner 
processes. The impact of current policies has to be reinforced by economic 
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instruments, like emission charges, product charges (fuels, cars) or trade-
able permits. In the light of the progress achieved in meeting 
environmental objectives, consideration has to be given to the 
possibility of complementing existing Community legislation e.g. 
the Large Combustion Plant Directive, with the use of economic 
instruments designed to achieve an incentive effect. 
3.3.4 Aircraft Noise 
Noise is a widespread source of nuisance and damage to health 
in the Community and a major environmental problem in terms 
of numbers of people affected. Air transport is an important 
source of noise, particularly in and around airports. The expected 
growth in demand for air transport services in the Community 
will further exacerbate the situation. The abatement of aircraft 
noise is directly regulated in the form of the ICAO noise approval 
certificates. A preferential landing treatment is also envisaged. 
Emission charges could act as a complement to these regula-
tions in that they are levied on landing rights and are differen-
tiated according to the noise level of the aircraft. Some Member 
States already apply aircraft noise charges for financing purposes. 
However, in order to have incentive effects, these charge rates 
need to be significantly increased. Moreover, in case Member 
States act in a coordinated way, an inefficient relocation of air 
traffic can be avoided. Therefore, a Community approach to charge 
aircraft noise emissions will be more effective. 
3.3.5 Road Traffic and Air Pollution 
Road traffic is, due to its extensive energy consumption, a 
substantial source of air pollution. Vehicles (passenger cars, lor-
ries, buses) are already subject to technical regulation in the 
framework of the Community environmental policy. Economic 
instruments have to be envisaged to strengthen these measures 
and to precede subsequent, more stringent steps in the process 
of direct regulation. They have to generate a gradual shift to-
wards more environmentally-friendly transport modes (public 
transport, bicycle) and to speed up the development and use of 
cleaner vehicles. 
In this context, the price of fuel is a strategic variable, and the 
level of it is to a considerable extent determined by excises. The 
intended harmonization of indirect taxation to remove fiscal bar-
riers in the Community will have important consequences for the 
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future evolution of fuel prices. According to the principles set 
out in the previous sections, minimum tariff levels and tariff bands 
have to incorporate in the long run all the environmental costs that are 
caused by the consumption of mineral oils and their derivatives. 
This holds for the environmental problems caused by transport 
activities, as well as by the energy and industrial sectors. 
Apart from fuel taxation, several forms of transport taxation 
exist which might provide a basis for taxation for environmental 
purposes. These are: 
a) vehicle tax or special consumer tax; 
b) annual road tax; 
c) taxes relating to vehicle usage; 
d) road-user charges or tolls. 
a) Vehicle tax or special consumer tax 
Examples of this instrument are dealt with in annex 2 
where tax reductions in Greece and tax differentiation are 
described. Basically, these systems, which are quite similar 
in their effects, consist of a subsidy on an early adaptation 
to future, more stringent environmental requirements. This 
instrument does not directly influence car mileage, but pro-
motes the establishment of a larger share of relatively clean 
cars. 
b) Annual road tax 
Annual registration taxes for passenger cars and lorries 
may vary either with the weight of the car, or with their 
engine capacity. However, annual road taxes could also be 
differentiated according to pollution characteristics, as is 
proposed in Germany for the annual vehicle tax for passen-
ger cars. This may be done by defining several classes in 
which quantitative measures of emission of nitrogen oxides, 
carbon monoxide, VOCs and possibly fuel consumption (as 
a proxy for the emission of carbon dioxide) are combined 
through a weighting procedure. If significantly differen-
tiated in this way road tax could promote a larger share of 
relatively clean vehicles and the development of cleaner 
cars. 
c) Taxes relating to vehicle usage 
A special form of car taxation consists of the so-called 
variabilization of the costs of car use. Usage of vehicles by 
the owners is influenced by "out-of-pocket" variable costs, 
such as the costs of fuel but not by the fixed costs of own-
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ership which do not vary with vehicle usage. Hence higher 
prices for car fuels will give an incentive for reduction in 
vehicle usage which will not be offset by a revenue neutral 
decrease of fixed costs (notably annual road tax). Higher 
excise duties for fuel and gasoline and LPG (and possibly 
diesel for the private car use market) may thus be counter-
balanced by lower annual road taxes, with the result that 
vehicle owners are encouraged to reduce the extent of ve-
hicle usage. 
In each of the three cases, it has to be defined how the existing 
direct regulation on vehicles at EC level can be complemented with a 
package of adequate incentives. These should aim at discouraging 
the use of the vehicle by higher fuel prices, and encouraging 
Member States to differentiate between vehicle taxes and annual 
road taxes according to environmental criteria. 
d) Road-user charges or tolls 
Road-user charges or tolls related to the environmental 
damage on pollution caused by vehicles may have an im-
portant role to play in promoting the shift towards more 
environmentally-friendly transport modes. Given the fact 
that many journeys, particularly for heavy goods vehicles, 
may involve transit through two or more Community coun-
tries (and sometimes to non-Community countries as well), 
there is a case for a coordinated or concerted approach at Com-
munity level to the imposition of such charges or tolls. The lack 
of a Communi~y approach should not, however, be used as 
an excuse to strike down national measures taken for legit-
imate environmental reasons. 
3.3.6 Waste 
Environmental problems caused by waste generation are a con-
sequence of its volume, its hazardous substances or its difficulty 
to recycle, due to the use of several materials or other reasons, 
such as the lack of adequate disposal or treatment facilities. Fol-
lowing the Communication on "A Community strategy for waste 
management" [SEC(89) 934 final], EC waste management policies 
have to be based on three basic rules. Firstly, the generation of 
waste should be prevented wherever possible. Secondly, waste 
should be re-used or recycled to the maximum feasible level. 
Finally, waste that cannot be treated otherwise should be safely 
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disposed of. Clearly, these rules are set in a priority order. Pre-
vention is preferred to recycling and recycling is preferred to 
disposal. Economic instruments that change the relative prices of pre-
vention, reuse, recycling, treatment, incineration and land disposal need 
to be promoted and developed in order to use the large potential for 
prevention and recycling. Several economic instruments may be con-
sidered. 
- Deposit-refund systems constitute a form of economic instru-
ment to promote the reuse, recycling and orderly disposal of 
wastes. These systems exist in certain countries (including 
Community Member States), notably for beverage containers 
and for cars. As elaborated in the Communication on "A 
Community strategy for waste management" [SEC(89) 934 
fina1], campaigns to improve reuse and recycling of waste 
should, to be fully effective, be accompanied by incentives 
such as deposits on returnable items and taxes (while these mea-
sures should not be discriminatory or be out of proportion 
to the aim in view). 
Actions at EC level need to be taken to promote the 
(re)development of deposit-refund systems in the Member 
States. To the extent that they may lead to distortion of trade 
patterns, "harmonized" deposit-refund systems should be adopted, 
for environmental as well as for Internal Market reasons. In other 
cases, a framework needs to be provided which specifies the require-
ments for a deposit-refund system to be compatible with Community 
law. Candidates are several products such as beverage con-
tainers, batteries (to encourage separated collection) and 
complex apparatus, such as cars and televisions (to encour-
age recycling of certain materials). 
In order to discourage the use of specific products with proble-
matical waste streams, a product charge/tax or tax differentiation 
can be introduced. Although a harmonization is required 
only to the extent that they may cause trade distortion, an 
EC initiative can be more effective. If there are no arguments 
to stimulate separate collection, a charge on non-refillable 
and non-recyclable packaging is a necessary complement for 
deposit-refund systems. A differentiation of VAT for recy-
cled plastics is another possible example. 
- A waste disposal charge has at minimum to cover all costs 
involved in the disposal operations including adequate pro-
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visions for insurances and after-care. In addition, however, 
it may be necessary to levy an incentive chargeltax on waste 
disposal, in view of the pressures on landfill and incineration 
capacity, and in order to meet the objectives of possible waste 
disposal plans. These incentives will prevent waste disposal 
and will encourage financing in waste treatment. Such 
chargesltaxes do already exist in some Member States (e.g. 
Denmark). In order to avoid distortions of trade or competition, a 
common framework for the application of waste disposal charges 
should be developed at Community level. 
- These disposal charges can differentiate according to the type 
of waste to be discharged, following risks of environmental 
damage and the related time period. The latter is also the 
case for nuclear waste. A proper disposal charge will help to 
diminish the waste stream as it will increase the price of 
nuclear-generated electricity which will m turn encourage 
energy-savmg. 
As these charges should not lead to improper (and possibly 
unlawful) waste disposal, it is essential that they are integrated 
with a management system which controls waste movement "from 
the cradle to the grave." Economic instruments should also be 
compatible with measures to reduce and control risks from trans-
port, by encouragement of treatment as close as possible to the 
source of the waste, and by provisions for liability for environ-
mental damage. 
An essential part of this integral approach is the analysis of 
priority waste streams on a Community level. It has to consider 
and provide for the proper instruments to achieve the targets for 
each priority waste stream, including economic and fiscal instru-
ments. 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
The Treaty (as amended by the Single European Act) sets out 
a framework for the development of a stronger environmental 
policy and requires the integration of environmental considera-
tions into other Community policies, especially in view of struc-
tural change stemming from completion of the Internal Market. 
Moreover, the use of economic incentives and market mecha-
nisms for the achievement of environmental policy objectives is 
very much consistent with the underlying philosophy of the Sin-
gle Market. 
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The development of economic and fiscal instruments of envi-
ronmental policy is also required at EC level, essentially to cope 
with pollution on a transboundary or a global scale, to prevent 
trade distortion, and to prevent each Member State from post-
poning action to avoid competitive disadvantages, even in the 
short term. Some specific environmental problems have been 
identified, and it is indicated how economic and fiscal instruments 
could contribute to their management e.g. in problems such as 
the greenhouse effect, water pollution, aircraft noise, road traffic 
and waste. 
The integration of environmental considerations is of particu-
lar relevance in the field of the harmonization of indirect taxation, 
which impinges to a certain extent on the future development of 
charges and taxes for environmental purposes. Indeed, after 
1992, levels on excises will largely be defined at Community level, 
and this has a particular environmental effect as far as mineral 
oils are concerned. In the transition period, the level at which 
harmonization takes place might also have particular environ-
mental consequences, as well as the definition of the normal or 
reduced VAT rate for particular goods and services. 
Precise judgments on the pros and cons of instruments for 
environmental protection cannot be made in general, either for 
the direct regulation type, or for economic instruments. As both 
direct regulation and economic instruments have their positive 
characteristics as well as their failures, mixed approaches are to 
be recommended. In many instances, economic instruments have 
potential advantages as a consequence of their being based on 
the market mechanism and promoting dynamic efficiency e.g. in 
generating investments in clean technology. 
It is worth pointing out that over a period of time the "new 
environmental fiscality" i.e. a fiscality based on penalizing pollu-
tion and environmental impact rather than, as at present, per-
sonal or corporate creativity, may generate substantial resources 
at national level (even if the overall effect is "revenue-neutral"). 
Though it may not be necessary, except in specific instances, to 
prescribe the areas of spending to which the products of the 
various environmental taxes or charges should be directed (the 
principle of "non-hypothecation"), it is not inconceivable that 
society itself will decide through the democratic process to accord 
a higher priority to environmental spending, particularly in view 
of the larger contribution the "environmental sector" will be mak-
ing to national revenues. 
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ANNEX 1 
A Comparison of Various Instruments of Environmental Policy 
Environmental charges and taxes 
Charges can provide an incentive for polluters to limit their 
emissions. They are a straightforward way to put prices on the 
use of the environment. Various forms exist: 
- Emission charges are charges on the discharge of pollutants 
into air, water or on the soil and on the generation of noise. 
Emission charges are calculated as to the quantity and quality 
of the pollutant. 
Product chargesltaxes are charges levied on products with 
features which render them harmful to the environment 
when used or disposed of. 
- Tax differentiation can discourage the consumption of pol-
luting products and simultaneously encourage the consump-
tion of cleaner alternatives, while having a neutral impact on 
the budget. Such measures may be applied in the form of 
excise taxes or through a differentiation of VAT tariffs. In 
this respect, a number of fiscal arrangements, stimuli and 
exemptions can be modified (e.g. to encourage public trans-
port instead of private road transport, to change spatial struc-
ture of housing and industrial activities, to discourage decay-
ing of houses and to stimulate renovation). 
Although "charges" and "taxes" are used for different purposes 
in different contexts, the difference between charges and taxes 
is determined by the way in which the revenues are allocated: tax 
revenues are added to the public budget, while charge revenues 
are used for financing environmental measures. As this report 
does not deal with the destination of the revenues, taxes and 
charges will be used as substitutes. 
Secondly, it is important to differentiate between charges ac-
cording to their objectives. Apart from their incentive' effect, 
charges also raise revenues. A clear distinction should be made 
between financing and incentive charges. The former may be 
desirable as sources of revenue, for instance for financing subsi-
dies, but will have only an incentive impact as a side-effect, if they 
are substantial. Incentive charges are created in order to establish 
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price charges, whereas in principle their revenues are of second-
ary importance. A return to society by reductions of other forms 
of taxation is quite conceivable and is to be decided by the Mem-
ber States. 
Thirdly, a distinction must be made between emission charges, 
and user charges. Emission charges are levied on the discharge 
of effluent and are calculated as to the quality and/or quantity of 
the pollution load. All dischargers are liable. User charges are 
charges paid for services rendered by authorities, for instance for 
collection and removal of municipal waste water and solid waste. 
Only those who are connected to these services pay the charge. 
User charges are not generally meant to have an incentive effect, 
though some e.g. road-user charges, may be intended to have 
one .. 
Regarding the need for action by the Community, a clear dis-
tinction should be made between emission charges and product 
charges. Due to practical circumstances, emission charges may in 
general be limited to stationary sources. If product charges are 
levied on products which are traded across borders, trade distor-
tion may occur if users of such goods buy them in Member States 
where these charges are not levied. 
Tradeable emission permits 
Tradeable permits operate in conjunction with direct regula-
tion. Where direct regulation provides "permits" for certain levels 
of emissions, polluters may buy and sell these permits. Thus, for 
example, polluters who perform better than required may gen-
erate "surplus" emission permits which can be stored for later 
use or sold to other parties under the regime. The scarcer these 
permits are, the higher is their price. 
When the present emissions are unevenly spread, as is the case 
for CO2 emissions, and when emission permits are equally dis-
tributed per capita, tradeable emission permits will "automati-
cally" result in a financial transfer from the most polluting to the 
least polluting regions and inhabitants. 
Different options exist for the initial distribution of the permits 
and determine to a large extent the impact of the system. Con-
trary to other economic instruments, the environmental objective 
in terms of emission reductions is defined a priori and, provided 
there are adequate control mechanisms and sanctioning, will be 
reached automatically. 
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Deposit-refund systems 
In deposit-refund systems a deposit is paid on potentially pol-
luting products. When pollution is avoided by returning the prod-
ucts or their residuals, a refund follows. 
Enforcement incentives 
Enforcement incentives, such as non-compliance fees and per-
formance bonds, are directly linked to physical regulation. Non-
compliance fees penalize polluters who exceed prescribed envi-
ronmental standards. Performance bonds are payments to au-
thorities (or insurance premium when transferring the risk in-
volved to insurance companies) which are returned when the 
polluter performs well according to his license. 
Financial aid 
Rapid environmental improvement is now established as a high 
priority for the Community. If the measures needed to secure 
this improvement would otherwise lead to severe economic dis-
ruption, there may in certain circumstances be a case for limited 
financial assistance to polluters, notwithstanding the general pre-
sumption against subsidies inherent in the Polluter Pays Principle. 
Industry agreements 
Although not an economic instrument as such, industry agree-
ments have an economic component in that they encourage pol-
luters voluntarily to accept certain standards in order to avoid a 
situation where some other instruments, be it direct or through 
the market mechanism, may put larger financial burdens on 
them. 
Environmental liability 
The most important element of strict environmental liability is 
the switch of burden of proof: in cases of damage the alleged 
polluter has to prove its innocence. When such risks are insured 
higher premiums will be imposed, unless the insured is able to 
reduce the environmental risks of his activities. 
Direct regulation 
Instruments which involve direct regulation require polluters 
individually to conform to standards which may be specified in 
terms of the inputs they use, the technology or process they apply 
or the outputs they produce. The most important instruments 
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are listed below in a sequence that represents a decreasing degree 
of flexibility for the regulated polluter. 
1) Emission standards 
2) Technology or process standards 
3) Product standards. 
Emission standards 
Authorities define, for specific pollutants, a level of emissions 
that the polluter is not allowed to exceed. 
Technology or process standards 
Authorities define types of technology, equipment or pro-
cesses that the polluter should, or should not, use. 
Product standards 
Authorities define minimum specifications for products and/ 
or inputs or product or input characteristics which are man-
datory or prohibited. 
Emission standards directly related to environmental impacts 
permit the polluter to respond flexibly, in terms of choice of the 
inputs, technology and product-mix, provided that the standard 
is met. 
Other types of standard are only indirectly linked to environ-
mental impacts and are in fact proxy measures. They are less 
flexible than emission standards, inasmuch as the polluter's dis-
cretion is limited with respect to the manner in which environ-
mental impacts are controlled. This implies, for instance, that 
technology standards are in general a non-optimal instrument 
(and this has been a main reason for creating the tradeable per-
mits policy in the USA). 
A Comparison of Various Policy Instruments 
Environmental effectiveness 
In some instances direct regulation can be a necessary option. 
Examples are toxic substances for which the target level of emis-
sions is very low or zero. In comparison with economic instru-
ments, direct regulation may provide stronger assurance that 
environmental objectives will be achieved, since economic instru-
ments always have the element of voluntariness. This is not gen-
erally true, however, since in many instances the lack of proper 
sanctions renders direct regulation measures less effective. These 
situations, however, might very well be a case for a mixed ap-
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proach. A combination of direct regulation and a charge system, 
or a system of marketable permits or non-compliance fees, might 
combine the best elements of both systems. 
Static efficiency 
In case an optimum is looked for in pure economic terms, 
environmental pollution will occur at the level where marginal 
social costs of reducing discharges equal the marginal social costs 
of environmental damage. Alternatively, a combination of direct 
regulation and market mechanisms could be used as, for instance, 
is the case of tradeable emission permits. Finally, polluters could 
be given incentives to limit their pollution, with the use of eco-
nomic instruments which depend solely upon the market mech-
anism, and without recourse to regulatory standards. 
Both direct regulation and economic instruments could-in 
principle-create a situation, in which maximum efficiency is at-
tained. This requires that all necessary information is available, 
which is not the case in practice. With imperfect information the 
levying of charges on emissions or products may be more efficient 
than the use of standards, since the former allow polluters to 
choose their own economically optimal solution, thus creating 
efficiency for society at large. Indeed, environmental taxes may 
offer additional benefits in terms of economic efficiency, if they 
generate revenue which permits a reduction in other types of 
taxation which are not economically efficient. 
In practice, effluent standards are stricter for new than for old 
pollution sources. Then, direct regulation provides an incentive 
to maintain old plants longer than would be the case under a 
charge regime. In this case charging would be more efficient in 
static (but possibly not in dynamic) terms: on the other hand, the 
regulatory solution might be perceived as more equitable. 
When monitoring of emissions or environmental impacts is 
very expensive or unreliable, neither direct regulation, nor emis-
sion charges can ensure a close approximation to an economically 
optimal solution. This is often the case, since monitoring is tech-
nically complex, instruments are imprecise, discharges may vary 
randomly and, in the case of self-monitoring, results might be 
unreliable. 
Dynamic efficiency 
Dynamic efficiency requires a constant adaptation to changing 
technology and to changing environmental conditions. Economic 
instruments generally perform better in this respect than direct 
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regulation. Once the polluter has complied with the new regu-
lation, there is no longer any incentive to reduce the pollution 
more than is required (although there may still be some incentive 
to achieve the required standard at lower cost). Charges can put 
a constant pressure on the polluter's budget, encouraging him 
frequently to reconsider the efficiency of his pollution reduction 
technology. In practice, in a situation with improved abatement 
technology and worsening environmental quality the charge re-
gime may offer a continuous incentive for further reduction in 
the polluter's discharges. 
Practicability and administration costs 
The agreement with the institutional framework is an impor-
tant element, such as the compatibility with the Treaty and EC 
regulations, and with international agreements such as the 
GATT. The administration costs of implementing economic in-
struments depend on many factors which are mainly connected 
to the type of instrument applied. 
Emission charges may require a large number of "trial and 
error" rounds in order to achieve the "optimal" charge rate 
(which may in practice be a constantly moving target). A large 
number of polluters will cause significant costs of information 
and monitoring. Self-monitoring requires periodic control. Once 
a system of charges has been established its implementation could 
in some circumstances become cheap and easy as compared to 
direct regulation. Nevertheless, in general monitoring and ad-
ministration costs for emission charges may be comparable with 
those for direct regulation, since the information required to set 
charges is similar to that needed for regulatory standards. 
Product charges may cause high administration costs when 
levied at the retail stage. 
Tradeable permits are firmly embedded in direct regulation 
and hence require the same extensive involvement of the au-
thorities. Furthermore, the US experience indicates that trans-
actions (trading of permits) are sometimes difficult to establish, 
which implies that transaction costs might be high. 
For deposit-refund systems a collection system must be orga-
nized. Administration costs can be a threat to the functioning of 
such systems, since these costs must be paid from the deposits 
that are not refunded, unless the refund is less than the deposit. 
As on the other hand these products have a positive value in the 
recycling process, the net costs will be lower. 
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Enforcement incentives may cause court costs, and industry 
agreements will be established only after ample deliberations. 
A general conclusion on the administrative efficiency of eco-
nomic instruments as compared to that of direct regulation is not 
possible. Administration costs must be assessed on a case-by-case 
basis. 
Fairness and acceptability 
In general, policies which are perceived as equitable will enjoy 
greater acceptance. Apart from the efficiency criterion, the Pol-
luter Pays Principle can be seen as a matter of equity i.e. those 
who pollute should pay for necessary abatement measures and 
for the remaining environmental damage they cause. In this con-
text it should be recognized that the application of economic 
instruments can have distributional effects which might be con-
sidered unacceptable for a number of reasons. 
Firstly, the efficiency criterion requires that pollution is abated 
where compliance costs are relatively low. Such a policy can result 
in economic hardship for specific sectors in society. Secondly, 
economic instruments (notably charges) might severely affect low-
Income groups. 
Regarding both economic instruments and direct regulation, 
the outcome in terms of financial burdens for various groups in 
society might be affected by negotiating power, which might be 
contrary to the criterion of fairness and acceptability. 
Economic impact 
Economic instruments create price changes which may nega-
tively affect the market position of those concerned. A positive 
result may be that firms under the charge regime are encouraged 
to develop new technology in advance of those who are not. This 
may create a competitive advantage with positive economic re-
sults, for instance in the export market. Positive as well as negative 
effects may, if substantial, affect the structure of the economy 
and create adjustment costs. Therefore, indicators such as eco-
nomic growth, the rate of inflation, international competitiveness, 
etc. need to be considered. 
Conclusion 
In principle, instruments of the direct regulation type and 
economic instruments aim for the same results, but in practice 
the outcome may differ. Especially with respect to long-term 
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efficiency economic instruments have the advantage of strong 
continuous pressure which they exert on polluters to strive for 
least-cost solutions. In some instances, economic instruments may 
prove to be more efficient in an administrative sense, but this 
should be judged on a case-by-case basis. 
ANNEX 2 
Some Successful Examples of Economic Instruments Currently Applied 
This section describes some successful examples of economic 
instruments as have been recently applied. They concern car 
taxation, water effluent (sic) charges, deposit-refund systems, tax-
ation of (un)leaded car fuel and a product tax on plastics. 
Tax differentiation for cars in Greece and in the Netherlands 
Greece imposes high tax levels on passenger cars. Now, cars 
that are provided with a 3-way catalytic converter have tax ad-
vantages up to 40%. Such cars for public purposes (taxis) are 
exempted from tax. These measures have been taken in order to 
speed up the penetration of cleaner cars in Greece, which is of 
paramount importance for the Athens area in particular. Car 
dealers frequently announce the price advantages of cleaner cars 
in their advertisements. This instrument is considered successful. 
The Netherlands apply a somewhat different system that, how-
ever, aims for the same results. In 1986 a tax differentiation on 
passenger cars was introduced. Cars that meet certain require-
ments with respect to the quality of their exhaust gases are 
granted a discount on the special consumer tax which is charged 
on top of the VAT. Depending on the size of the car's engine 
and on the standards they meet (European standards or US-83 
standards), discounts of ECU 725 or ECU 360 are granted. A 
special feature of this fiscal measure is its ex ante budget-neu-
trality. The discounts are financed through an increase of the 
special consumer tax on all other cars. This measure was pro-
longed in early 1989. Now small cars (less than 1,4 litres cylinder 
content) which meet the requirements also benefit from the dis-
count. 
Within the course of half a year the sales of these cars increased 
from almost 5 to 60%. As in Greece, car dealers have quickly 
adapted to these measures and often promote clean cars in their 
advertisements. As a result of the tax differentiation cleaner cars 
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have the same price as the less clean alternatives. This measure 
offers car dealers and car owners a free possibility to show a 
positive environmental behaviour. Those who continue to buy 
cars not equipped with a catalytic converter pay certain amount 
of money because of the additional amount of air pollution they 
produce. 
Water effluent charge in Germany 
In 1976 water effluent charges were announced in Germany. 
They became operational in 1981, with increasing charge rates 
per unit of pollution from ECU 6 in 1981 to ECU 19 in 1986. 
Charges are imposed on households, firms and other institutions 
who discharge effluents into the water. The objectives of the 
charge system are to stimulate dischargers to purify their ef-
fluents, to develop and adopt new less-polluting technologies and 
to obtain funds for the improvement of surface water quality. 
The charge is calculated on the basis of a number of parame-
ters. These include chemical oxygen demand, organic halogen 
compounds, heavy metals and toxicity to fish. 
The incentive character of this emission charge is reflected by 
a system of correction on the charge bill in the case of a good 
performance of the polluters. The most important corrections 
are discounts on the charge bill, if actual discharges are lower 
than those laid down in the permit and for the stimulation of 
investments. Discounts amount up to 80% when the polluter 
applies the best available technique. 
The charge system has resulted in a substantial increase in 
water treatment capacity, in both collectively and privately owned 
installations. In 1975 43% of the effluent was not treated biolog-
ically or chemically, against only 18% in 1983. Some firms with 
old licenses have treated their waste water more than required in 
order to avoid part of the charge payment. Many municipalities 
claim that they have intensified their water treament activities. 
Better results of water quality management were already re-
ported in the period 1976-1981, i.e. before the introduction of 
the charging system. A fair anticipation period has no less incen-
tive impact than the charge system itself. 
In 1986 some amendments were decided on to reinforce the 
charge system, including an increase of the charge rate from 
ECU 19 to ECU 29. These have been put into operation in 1989 
and 1990. 
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Deposit-refund systems in Denmark 
Denmark operates deposit-refund systems for beverage con-
tainers used for beers, wine and soft drinks. To support these 
systems, cans are not allowed as containers for drinks. This results 
in a return of drink containers close to 100% and in the absence 
of littering with cans. 
Basic elements of the Danish system are: 
1) a deposit to be laid on the container, ranging from ECU 
00.7 to ECU 0.30 per bottle; 
2) an obligation for retailers to accept empty bottles; 
3) a restriction of the number of bottles types that were al-
lowed. 
With some amendment, the Danish system has been approved 
by the Court of Justice with explicit reference to environmental 
protection as a objective that can justify national restrictions, so 
long as no harmonization by way of a Community Regulation has 
taken place. 
A charge on non-biodegradable plastic bags in Italy 
In 1989 Italy introduced a charge on non-biodegradable plastic 
bags, whether domestically produced or imported. This charge 
trebled the price from ECU 0.03 to ECU 0.09 per bag. Since the 
introduction of the charge the consumption of plastic bags de-
clined by some 40%. This is a good example of how pricing can 
change behaviour. 
Price differential between leaded and unleaded gasoline 
The majority of EC Member States apply an excise tax differ-
ential between leaded and unleaded gasoline. A number of coun-
tries recently increased the differential in order to enlarge the 
market share of unleaded gasoline. In the UK, for instance, the 
differential is now equivalent to about 8% of the retail price. The 
market share of unleaded increased from 4% to 30% in the 
period April 1989 to March 1990. 
It is generally recognized that the creation of the price differ-
ential between leaded and unleaded gasoline has largely accel-
erated the compliance with direct EC regulation i.e. the wide-
spread availability of unleaded petrol, which is a sine qua non 
condition for the introduction of 3-way catalytic converters. An 
early EC regulation related to such a price differential therefore 
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would have eased a more efficient penetration of unleaded petrol 
in the market. 
The Dutch environmental authorities decided to try to ban 
leaded normal petrol from the market. An additional excise tax 
on leaded normal petrol created a tax differentiation of ECU 
3.40 per 100 litres with unleaded normal petrol. This brought 
about the expectation of a sharp decline in demand for leaded 
normal petrol which induced the oil companies to withdraw it 
from the market. 
